This section discusses the causes of defeat in war, not just in single battles per se. Some of the general reasons for defeat are:

Advice
ignoring well thought out and superior recommendations…

Anti-War Movements
citizens protesting against the war…

Appointments
when inept officers are given important roles to play in a battle or war…

Arguments
when military personnel do not agree on strategy and/or tactics and cause confusion in operations.

Armaments
when a Nation State cannot match the arms of an enemy Nation State…

Arrogance
the classic case of hubris…

Asymmetrical Conflict
when a well-armed Nation State fights a lesser armed Nation State but leaves itself vulnerable to a different style of warfare…

Attack Hesitancy
when an offense is low to maneuver allowing the defense time to counterattack…

Bad Luck
when negative events occur that were unforeseen…

Battlefield
when a commander chooses the wrong place and time for a battle…

Carelessness
when commanders become overconfident and take unnecessary chances…

Chain of Command
when there is no clear-cut commander during a battle or war…

Change Failure
when military personnel to not take into consideration the different circumstances of the current armed conflict, a paradigm shift in tactics and strategy…

Change Timing
making hasty and last minute changes to well-planned out strategies, operations and tactics…

Civil War
when a Nation State suffers civil unrest before or during a war with another Nation State…

Commanders Arguing
military leaders disagreeing amongst themselves both within a single branch and between branches as to what tactic or strategy to follow…

Commander Competition
when military leaders attempt to compete with each other for honor and victory…

Communication Breakdowns
when military personnel or technologies fail to properly inform others, the fatal telephone game phenomena when verbal orders are given to multiple messengers and are then changed over the course and sequence of delivery…

Confusing Orders
when a commander issues contradictory orders and does not seem in control…

Cost
when a Nation State uses very expensive arms to fight an enemy using inexpensive weapons and therefore is able to continue the armed conflict for a longer period of time…

Cowardly Behavior
the inability to feel and exhibit courage…

Daring Plan
lead by a cautious or cowardly commander…

Deficient Science, Technology and Industry
falling behind in the right kind of education…

Discipline Failure
when commanders allow their military personnel to relax when they should be alert…

Disrespecting the Enemy
feeling that the opponent is less worthy and incompetent…

Different Circumstances
when commanders follow strategies, operation and tactics that worked in one situation in another than is fundamentally different…

Disease
extreme sickness due to a number of reasons…

Divided Command
usually results in confusion, delay and in-fighting…

Economic Collapse
when the Nation State’s financial structure unravels…

Economic Status
when a Nation States economic resources and size cannot match those of an enemy Nation State…

Ethnicity Mandate
Nation States that favor a multi-cultural, ethnic or religious population over a patriotic or nationalistic public could be more prone to security failure thus be more vulnerable to attack…

Failures
in leadership, planning, execution and adaptation and failures to adapt, anticipate and learn…

False Negotiations
when leaders and commanders allow themselves to be seduced into time-consuming insincere negotiations by an enemy…

Fatal Flaws
negative character and personality traits such as hubris…

Fatigue
when the armed force is tired from lack of sleep and rest…

Fear of Leader
military officers not responding to the immediate situation, but relying on order given by other officers or political leaders not in the battle space…

Fifth Column
traitors, infiltration of enemy propaganda posing as education or information…

Force Dispersion
when a Nation State has an overwhelming armed force, but because of multiple security risks cannot concentrate its power in any one region thereby allowing a less powerful potential enemy to gain the advantage…

Hubris
when a Nation State feels falsely that its culture and society are superior to that of an enemy Nation State and hold a condescending attitude toward them as inferior leading to overconfidence…

Ignoring Recommendations
refusing the realize the importance of preparedness…

Immigration
when a Nation State is overrun by immigrants not loyal to its culture, society and government…

Incompetence
when military personnel do not have the skills to perform their basic duties…

Intelligence Dismissal
when domestic policymakers ignore the advice of security agencies…

Intelligence Failures
when vital information is not known about the enemy…

Internal Strife
when commanders do not respect one another…

Irrational Government
folly – brought on by greed, selfish ambition and moral cowardice…

Lacking Respect
when a Nation State does not value the moral and physical strength of a potential enemy…

Limitations
a commander should respect limitations and not try to advance under adverse conditions…

Logistics Failure
when supplies of ammunition and food/water are not available…

Losing Enterprise
when a Nation State doubles down when retreat is the prudent decision, know when to cut your losses and walk away…

Low Moral
fighting the wrong war, confusion about what is right and what is wrong…

Media Opposition
most journalists are against the war…

Military Blunders
mistakes made in tactics, operations and strategy, not responding to changes in warfare from the last war fought, fighting a limited war rather than a total war, fighting the war they would like rather than fighting the war that is…

Military Incompetence
appointing officers because of favoritism or status, not qualifications…

Misinformation
when a Nation State accepts the deception of an enemy Nation State…

Misjudgment
when a Nation State does not understand the plans of an opponent…

Misreading the Enemy
not understanding the cultural basis influencing the enemy and its tactics and strategies…

Moral Doubts
when a Nation State questions its own ethical and moral standards…

Orders
when officers give confusing or wrong orders to their military personnel…

Organizational Failure
when the structure of a military organization leads it to lose battles…

Outguessing Tactics From Afar
when a commander is not on the battlefield and gives orders to military personnel at and during the battle…

Overconfidence
when military personnel feel superior to the task at hand…

Overestimating Citizens’ Patience
thinking that the country is behind the government’s actions…

Overreach
when a commander continues to advance finding that his logistics and supplies have been compromised…

Political vs. Military Disagreements
arguments over how to fight the war…

Poor Planning
when a Nation State does not prepare the proper strategies, operations and/or tactics when confronting an enemy Nation State…

Pressured Decision Making
when time does not allow a thoughtful rational approach for action…

Previous War Syndrome
when policymakers and military commanders conduct a current war with strategy and tactics similar to wars fought in the past, the tendency to fight the last war, the fallacy of traditional thinking…

Pride
when a Nation State or commanders consider pride over prudence…

Public Morale
defeat occurs when citizens believe they are  beaten…

Quality Deficit
any Nation State that puts equality over quality will suffer a security failure…

Questioning the War
betrayal, constantly asking if the war is really necessary or worth it…

Recruitment
when a Nation State allows or hires military personnel not loyal to its survival…

Rivalry
when commanders from the same or different armed services engage in competition rather than cooperation…

Self Interest
when leaders are more concerned with their own interests opposed to that of their Nation State…

Stubbornness
when military personnel do not listen to the facts…

Subdividing Forces
when a commander splits his forces into smaller and smaller units…

Subordinate Confusion
when underlings do not understand the orders they have been given…

Swords to a Gunfight
when a Nation State is fighting with weaker and wrong weapons…

Tactical Victory/Strategic Defeat
when a military wins a battle but loses a war due to various individual or combined operational mistakes including: the failure to recognize the correct sequence and timing of actions; the improper linking and sequencing of actions, maneuvers not aimed at the enemy’s center of gravity, the ignoring of culminating points due to victory fever among other reasons, and deficiencies in recognizing the need for operational reserves and sustainment…

Technological Inferiority
when a Nation State does not have or use the latest technology related to armaments, communications and/or weapons…

Technology Misuse
when military personnel do not understand or choose to not follow the capabilities of their technology…

Timidity
a Nation State that does not have the courage to engage in armed conflict…

Timing Mistakes
when quick action is needed, there is hesitation, when caution is needed, there is foolhardiness, when unity is needed, there is factionalism and infighting…

Trade Strangulation
the ability of the enemy to control the trade of vital resources including food and energy sources…

Trap
inability to see a dangerous obstacle and enter into a negative environment…

Trusting
putting one’s trust in an unreliable source…

Two Front War
if possible a Nation State should never engage in a multiple front war…

Underestimating the Enemy
downgrading the character and strength of the foe…

Unimaginative Strategy/Tactics
when a commander does not demonstrate creative thinking or judgement…

Underestimating the Enemy
not understanding the strength of the opposing armed forces…

Unpreparedness
failing to recognize the danger of approaching war…

Unresponsive Ally
fighting for and with an ally who does not share one’s own goals or aspirations…

Victory Disease
often caused by hubris after a successful tactical campaign it can lead to aggressive arrogance, overconfidence and over-optimism about achieving strategic goals…

Weak Economy
falling GDP, and spending beyond one’s means…

Weakened Conditions
recently having fought other wars…

Weak Military
reduced budgets for military personnel and equipment…

Wrong War
the belief by the public that the current war is not necessary and even harmful and against what the Nation State is supposed to stand for…

For additional analysis please refer to the Bibliography.

There have been a number of studies dealing with aspects of defeat by various academic scholars. A few of these are summarized below:

Blinders, Blunders and Wars
(Gompert, David C. and Binnendijk, Hans and Bonny, Lin. 2014. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.)

Causes of Defeat apply when policymakers are especially prone to make mistakes when:

  • “information is ignored, altered, misconstrued, or manipulated to fit predispositions;
  • excessive reliance is placed on intuition and experience;
  • arrogance, egotism, or hubris causes unwarranted confidence;
  • a rigid but wrong strategic concept or vision prevails;
    contingencies are not considered;
    enemy will or capabilities are underestimated;
  • operational difficulty or duration is underestimated;
  • dissent and debate are stifled.”

“As a number of cases reveal, states, statesmen, and institutions are captivated by some Big Idea, whether received or of their own creation: geostrategic or economic imperative, existential fear, powerful ideology, competitive impulse, lust for empire, martial-ethos biased, jingoistic enthusiasm for victory, grandiose vision, Manifest Destiny. While subjectivity is inherent in politics and policies, it can also subvert rationality, degrade analysis, discourage dissent, discount risk, ignore contingencies, and short-circuit analysis of options other than war. Such factors may be aggravated by psychiatric issues of leaders, such as megalomania, mysticism, visions, unwarranted self-confidence, the lack of self-awareness, and even mental disorder.

At the same time, to diagnose those who commit strategic blunders as mentally unsound is to imply that sound-minded leaders are incapable of committing them, which would be a serious error.”

Decision making is information processing. At times decision making is interdependent with both parties reacting to the other’s decisions.

Information is necessary but is not sufficient to avoid strategic mistakes. Faulty human evaluation (underused and misused) of even good data can lead to wrong decisions.

Intuition depends on experience. When new situations and unfamiliar circumstances arise, intuition suffers and it is better to rely on reasoned thought rather than gut instincts.

“Ask a roomful of historians what causes strategic blunders and you might get sundry answers spanning a wide range:

  • lack of information, perhaps because of poor intelligence collection;
  • poor processing of collected intelligence into useful information;
  • failure to share intelligence and other information with decision makers;
  • misinterpretation of intelligence;
  • failure to absorb and convert information into sound knowledge;
  • bias of decision makers against information that does not conform to their beliefs;
  • failure to relate knowledge to choices at hand;
  • insufficient or unclear communications with the adversary or other parties;
  • underestimating the adversary’s capabilities to make war;
  • underestimating the adversary’s will;
  • assuming the ally will conform to one’s own plans;
  • underestimating operational difficulties in implementing a decision;
  • overestimating the value of surprise or when the enemy can recover;
  • overestimating the effects of surprise or how long it will take the adversary to rebound;
  • underestimating the duration and costs of conflict;
  • overlooking or refusing to consider options before making a decision;
  • stifling of dissent, discouraging independent thinking, and cutting off debate;
  • lack of candor on the part of advisors and commanders;
  • megalomaniacal, messianic, or psychologically unbalanced leaders;
  • arrogance or hubris;
  • paranoia;
  • powerful emotions and loss of objectivity: nationalism, grievance, revenge;
  • demonizing the adversary;
  • dehumanizing the adversary;
  • equating the leader’s interests with the state’s interests;
  • harmfully excessive secrecy or compartmentalization;
  • insulation from reality;
  • rigid adherence to ideology or principles;
  • enthrallment with an awed vision or strategy;
  • excessive reliance on successful experience, especially if recent;
  • misreading or discounting history;
  • relying too heavily on history;
  • belief that there is no other choice consistent with the state’s well-being;
  • haste;
  • a hardening of views and closing of ranks over time;
  • unwarranted confidence in intuition, instinct, gut feeling;
    disinclination to reconsider a decision despite evidence against it.”

“…blunders…relate to flawed cognitive models- that is, simplifications of reality devised and used by individual decisionmakers and institutions to cope with complexity”

“In the mid-twentieth century, the Nobel Prize-winning economist (and psychologist, political scientist, and computer scientist) Herbert Simon put his finger on a key problem of real-world complexity: The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problem whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality.”

Simon argued that because of this reality, humans form models to simplify their analytic process, and often these models are misleading. “…danger may be prevalent when decision models are held with especially strong conviction, perhaps because of ideology, rigid principles, powerful emotion, bold vision, belief in destiny, superstition, or just plain stubbornness.”

The March to Folly – From Troy to Vietnam
(Tuchman, Barbara W. 1984. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.)

There are many roads to defeat, and many instances when governments have acted against their own interests. Some of the primary reasons that Nation States suffer defeat are the hubris, excessive ambition, incompetence and folly of leadership and of a demoralized citizenship. In this case, folly is defined as the “pursuit of policy contrary to the self-interest of the…state.” Most Nation States suffer from this malady from time to time.

Some examples of folly are:

  • The Trojans taking in that Greek made Wooden Horse when they knew better;
  • Montezuma and his huge army giving up his kingdom to a few hundred Spaniards;
  • George III insisting on coercing his American colonies when there was little thought of revolution;
  • Napoleon’s and Hitler’s invasion of Russia when Charles XII showed that it couldn’t be done;
  • Chiang Kai-shek refusing to reform until it was too late to save his version of China;
  • Lyndon Johnson carrying on a war in Vietnam when all intelligence foretold of defeat.

These are just a very few examples of defeat of Nation States based on various causal factors related to folly.

The Fall of France, 1940– Causes and Responsibilities
(Osgood, Samuel M. (ed.) 1972. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company.)

A short study of the French defeat by the Germans in 1940 and its varied circumstances serve to illuminate why a Nation State might face disaster. This book deals with some of the primary reasons why a Nation State like France was defeated in war. Here the question is asked not what caused Germany to attack France, but instead what were the causes of the French surrender at the end of the Battle of France.

It seems such factor elements as political, military, diplomatic, intellectual, social and psychological are to blame for the French fiasco. The question is what makes a seemingly strong country with a powerful military surrender in such a sudden way. The French disaster can serve as a useful model. This is a cautionary tale.

Among some of the primary reasons cited are the following:

Alliance Breakdown
the German/Soviet Pact removed Russia as a potential ally of France, therefore no Eastern Front to take the heat out of the Western Front…

Appeasement
the conservative’s belief that it would be better to form an accommodation, alignment and possibility an alliance with Germany than be at war with its Nazi regime or have the far left in power…

Army Plots
influenced by Franco’s rightist military regime successfully overthrowing Spain’s socialist leaning government thereby eliminating the left, certain officers were willing to support a coup d’état or even a civil war thus becoming a neutral in an upcoming war with Germany…

Bitter Memories
remembering the suffering experienced during the First World War even though France was one of the victors…

Bureaucratic Tendencies
the fact that organizational structures often reveal routine mentality and professional arrogance that can impede needed change, even in times of war…

Cowardice
the lack of heroism, the civilian desire to flee in the face of the enemy even though in times of war private concerns need to take a second place and defending the front and the very existence of the Nation State and its way of life is the only thing that should matter…

Divided Nation State
extreme differences in wealth between the few and the many leading to feelings of anger and despair…

Domestic Violence
constant political  agitation of the left and the right crippling the working of Parliament and undermining the Government, also for certain collaborators leading to a feeling for renewed law and order, thus suggesting that the Nazi Party of Germany was the correct way of acting…

Extreme Politics
a divided Nation State, the far right and the far left, both of which hated the Third Republic, disabled France’s political system from functioning…

Failed Military Preparations
not being adequately prepared for armed conflict…

Failure to Act
even when there was intelligence of where and when the German invasion was going to take place, the military did not make the appropriate decisions and maneuvers…

Feudal Code
the outmoded belief that it is not noble to conduct manufacturing and trade thus impeding economic development which left France behind the other militarized industrialized Nation States of Europe…

Fifth Column
the enemies within…

Industrial Failure
France remained a country of wood, wind and water, also suffering from a lack of coal, when other Nation States were driving their economy with steam and iron…

Intellectual Decline
of the 19thand 20thcenturies compared to the 17thand 18thcenturies…

Labor Strikes
the trade unions seriously disrupting the armament industries…

Long Historical Decline
the demise of the general will, the destabilization and fragmentation of France’s economic, political, and military communities of the 19thand 20thcentury as opposed to the powerful and united France of the 17thand 18thcenturies…

Mayor’s Requests
asking the Army not to defend their towns in order to spare them the ruin of battle…

Middleclass Angst
the feeling of the so-called bourgeoisie that there were losing their place in society thus making them less supportive of the Nation State…

Memory
the psychological need to forget the suffering of the First World War, and the desire to experience better times now that that war was over…

Military Salvation
the concept that the Armed Forces are more interested in protecting themselves rather than the Nation State…

Moral Weakness
the feeling that the Second World War generation could not live up to the heroic deeds of the First World War generation so as to lead to escapism and the pursuit of pleasure over respect for the government institutions that declared war against Germany…

Obsolete Military Doctrines
fighting with tactics/operations and strategies of the First World War in the Second World War, failing to respect the power of tanks and airplanes…

Offensive Failure
the strategy of relying only on defensive operations not offensive operations…

Parliamentary Chaos
governed by 20 different ministries over just 8 years, the malfunctioning and below par individuals running the executive and legislative bodies…

Population Disparities
the vast difference in the size of the French as opposed to the German population…

Preparedness Failure
even after the Second World War broke out, the Nation State did not in time and with vigor get ready to fight, either with arms or with men…

Reduced Military Capacity
the loss of so many fighting men during the First World War accompanied by a declining birth rate…

Strategy Mistakes
opting for a defensive strategy failing to fortify the Northern borderlands – the Belgian frontier or the line of the Ardennes – the traditional path of invasion…

The Great War
never fully recovering from the devastation of the First World War…

Treason
the enthusiasm to establish a new government – the Vichy Regime…

Workers Attitudes
the difference between the French and German work hours and work ethic…

The Wrong War – Why We Lost in Vietnam
(Record, Jeffrey. 1998. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/books/first/r/record-war.html.)

Another study dealing with the American defeat in Vietnam is also instructive. Among some of the key reasons cited for America’s loss are the following:

Asian Land War
ignoring the long standing military strategy of not getting involved in a land war in Asia and the lessons learned from the Korean War and of the French defeat in Indochina…

Citizens Lack of Support
a growing anti-war movement, continuous anti-war demonstrations…

Disorganized Ally
aiding a Nation State that was convulsed with domestic problems…

Domestic Imperatives
going into a war for the wrong reasons, the feeling that a Democratic administration could not afford another loss to the communists i.e. China and the neutralization of Laos which was considered a sellout to the communists, being accused of appeasement and being soft-on-communism, the belief in the domino theory…

Drafting Civilians
ordering angry students and other young men to fight in a war that they did not believe in…

Existential Interests
the United States was never in direct danger from the North Vietnamese…

Defeat Avoidance
continued fighting so as not to suffer a defeat when winning is becoming impossible…

Lack of Vision
leaders disagreeing amongst themselves about the nature and reason for the war…

“In his masterpiece, On War, Carl von Clausewitz observed that the “first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its true nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive” (Record. 1998. 1).

Media Negativity
constant criticism from journalists, the use of television that brought uncensored video into American homes showing the wounded and dead and the devastation to the South Vietnamese people…

Military Mistakes
fighting the war in the wrong way, using tactics, operations and strategy that did not match the conflict, conducing a limited war with limited aims, an unwillingness to invade North Vietnam because among other reasons that the Chinese might come to the aid of Hanoi…

Operational Difficulties
the problem of fighting a land based jungle war where naval and air forces would be restricted and allowing the enemy to hide and maneuver with impudence…

Overestimating Citizen Support
failing to recognize the enormous feelings against the war…

Political and Military Disagreements
relating to how to fight the war…

Underestimating the Enemy
not understanding the tenacity of the North Vietnamese to suffer great loses of men and equipment…

Wrong War
getting involved in a civil war driven by nationalism and anti-colonialism that had little to nothing to do with America’s core security interests or its international reputation as a guarantor of its allies’ security…

One flip-side to these various causes of defeat of the Vietnam War was that of the North Vietnamese underestimating the United States. The North Vietnamese believed that America would not want to fight them because the United States did not help the nationalists defeat the communists in China; or help France defeat the Viet Minh in Indochina; nor did they believe that the United States would be willing to help a politically weak and militarily incompetent regime in Saigon.

It seems that the lessons learned from the French defeat by the Germans and the American defeat by the North Vietnamese relate to the issues faced today by many other Western and Westernized Nation States. Additionally, a basic question remains. Can any Nation State long endure without a unified goal and to be able to conduct a war without the support of the populace.